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Special Feature
– Deflation Scare – Not in Poland
The economy most likely entered a recession phase in
the 1Q2009, defined as at least two quarters of
negative quarterly growth, as we forecast that GDP is
likely to decline in the y-o-y terms not only in
the 1Q2009, but in the 2Q2009 as well. This view is
based on the supply side developments in the 1Q2009.
Credit to non-financial firms came to a standstill in
the 1Q2009 mainly because of a credit crunch, i. e.
problems of credit supply, but firms stopped asking for
investment credit as well so demand for credits also fell.
Short-term growth prospects for the economy have
markedly worsened since writing the previous report.
The latest round of downward revisions to global
growth forecasts is probably the last one in this slump,
but it also drags down our growth forecasts for the
Polish economy. Lately, the rate of decline in output in
OECD countries hase been slower than in the 4Q2008
and the beginning of 2009, business confidence
improved, but the bottom has not been reached yet.
This poses a question mark whether the Polish
economy will bottom out in the 2Q2009 as we had
thought. We forecast a decline in GDP year on year in
the 2Q2009, albeit slower than in the 1Q2009,
a resumption of slow growth in the 3Q2009 and its
pickup in the 4Q2009 above 2% yoy (Table 1).
Recovery should gather strength in 2010, fuelled by
the infrastructure investment and exports. Potential
GDP growth will not be restored until the late 2010,
depending on the strength of the world-wide recovery.
Despite a slowdown in average real wage growth and
rising unemployment throughout the 2009,
consumption growth should remain relatively stable,
supported by the decline in personal income tax whose
positive impact will be more visible with the lapse of
time. The government will likely arrest growth in public
consumption in the 2H2009, i.e. after the elections to
European parlament, because of the precarious state
of public finances, but its strong growth in the 1H2009
should keep it at least unchanged, if not in a positive
territory, in 2009. Public investment should pick up in
the course of the year to offset the decline in the
private investment to a higher and higher degree. This
will exert some positive ripple effects on business
investment, in particular in non-residential
construction. Contrary to the previous forecast, the net
export contribution to GDP growth should be positive
in all quarters of 2009 as the slowly improving
economic prospects in the EU will help Polish firms
exploit their competitive edge over foreign companies
due to the depreciated zloty despite that the zloty
should firm in the course of the year. 
The labor market situation in the 1Q2009 seriously
deteriorated following the fall in economic growth
and widely expected recession. Employment in the
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so-called enterprise sector decreased by 0.2% yoy in
the 1Q2009. It was the first employment reduction in
y-o-y terms since the 4Q2004. The situation seems to
deteriorate most dynamically in the manufacturing.
Following the reduction of expected GDP growth, our
forecast concerning the employment growth is also
more pessimistic than in the previous PEO issue. We
expect that in 2009, on average, employment in the
enterprise sector will actually fall by 3.6% yoy and the
LFS employment will fall by 1.3% yoy. Wage dynamics
is still weakening. We expect the downward trend to
last, following the continuing economic downturn.
On average, nominal wages will grow in 2009 by 4%
– 5% and real wages by about 2%. During 2010 real
wage growth on a y-o-y basis can even fall to 1.4%-
1.5% you, but then it will start to accelerate reaching
the average of about 2% yoy. We expect the
registered unemployment rate to reach 12.8% at the
end of 2009, while the LFS unemployment rate will
probably grow to 9%.
Inflation proved more persistent than we
forecasted and Poland is an outlier among the EU
countries, where inflation has been consistently
downtrending. With demand side pressures in check
it was the supply-side-triggered price hikes that led
the inflationary process in initial months of the year
– although this time they are neither high nor likely to
be long-lasting. The CPI inflation rate declined
to 3.2% year on year in the first quarter of 2009
from 3.7% in the final quarter of 2008, benefiting
from falling prices of fuel, transportation,
telecommunication and most market services. Prices
of foodstuffs that were primarily responsible for the
deceleration of inflation in the second half of 2008,
rebounded in January 2009 and have been on the rise
since then. Adding to inflationary pressures were
prices of energy, continuing their upward trend and
peaking in the first quarter at the highest level in
more than a decade. Compared to the previous issue
of PEO, we significantly raised forecasts of both CPI
Data CASE forecasts
2008 2009Indicator
2006 2007 2008
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2009 2010
Nominal GDP, PLN bn 1060.0 1176.7 1271.7 297.8 310.6 314.3 349.0 305.7 319.6 322.2 363.1 1310.6 1380.3
(% change, yoy)          
GDP 6.2 6.7 4.9 6.1 6.0 5.0 3.0 -1.3 -0.5 0.1 2.0 0.0 3.0
Private Consumption 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.3 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.0
Fixed Investment 14.9 17.6 8.1 15.7 14.7 3.5 4.4 -10.0 -10.9 -6.4 -2.5 -6.9 1.0
(4Q, % of GDP)          
CA balance -2.7 -4.7 -5.5 -5.0 -5.2 -5.3 -5.5 -4.1 -3.5 -2.9 -2.5 -2.5 -2.6
           
(% change, yoy)          
Exports (NBP, EUR) 20.4 13.4 12.7 21.2 19.8 19.5 -7.5 -22.9 -19.0 -17.0 4.8 -14.2 7.0
Imports (NBP,(EUR) 24.0 19.5 14.9 22.5 21.7 22.6 -4.4 -28.9 -25.7 -19.5 -0.6 -19.1 5.0
     
(% change, yoy)    
Industrial sales 11.2 9.5 3.3 8.5 8.5 3.4 -6.3 -10.0 -5.8 -2.0 1.0 -4.3 2.5
Gross value added 6.0 6.6 5.0 5.6 6.3 4.9 3.5 -1.2 -0.6 0.1 1.9 0.1 3.2
           
CPI 1.0 2.5 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.7 3.7 3.2 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 2.3
PPI 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.4 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.4 3.3
Nominal Ave. Wage 4.9 8.7 10.4 10.1 11.6 10.6 7.7 6.3 5.3 4.0 2.3 4.4 3.2
           
Employment %, LFS 3.1 3.1 3.7 4.6 3.5 3.6 3.0 0.7 -1.5 -1.9 -2.4 -1.3 0.0
Registered unemployment
rate (%, eop)
14.8 11.4 9.5 10.9 9.4 8.9 9.5 11.2 10.9 11.7 12.8 12.8 14.3
           
 PLN/EUR, eop 3.83 3.58 4.17 3.53 3.35 3.41 4.17 4.50 4.40 4.35 4.10 4.33 3.90
           
WIBOR 3M, %,  ave 4.20 5.68 5.88 6.15 6.65 6.63 5.88 4.17 4.00 3.80 3.75 3.65 4.50
Central bank key rate eop 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.75 6.00 6.00 5.00 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.00
           
(% change, yoy eop)          
Broad Money (M3) 16.0 13.4 18.6 13.6 16.3 17.3 18.6 17.5 15.0 10.0 7.0 7.0 8.5
         
Loans to HH 33.4 37.9 44.6 37.4 34.4 33.5 44.6 43.7 32.5 20.0 11.0 11.0 9.0
         
Loans to Firms 13.7 24.1 29.0 25.2 24.5 24.1 29.0 25.8 21.0 13.0 6.1 6.0 5.0
           
(% GDP)          
Fiscal Balance -3.9 -1.9 -3.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. -3.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -5.5 -3.7
Public Debt eop 47.7 44.9 47.1  n.a. 43.1 n.a. 47.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 52.0 54.0
Table 1. The Polish economy – main macroeconomic indicators and CASE forecasts
Sources: CSO (GUS), Eurostat, NBP and CASE own calculations.
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Economic growth
The economy most likely entered a recession phase in the 1Q2009, defined
as at least two quarters of negative quarterly growth, since GDP is likely to
decline in the y-o-y terms not only in the 1Q2009, but in the 2Q2009 as well.
This view is based on the supply side developments in the 1Q2009.
According to the preliminary data, economic activity weakened in the 1Q2009.
Industrial output of firms with at least 9 employees fell by 10% yoy in
the 1Q2009, dragged down by mining whose output fell by 16.7% yoy, but on
par with that of manufacturing, in which sales decreased by 9.9% % yoy, pulled
down by dwindling exports. Construction registered a 1.3% yoy drop in its sales.
Retail sales fell by 0.9% yoy in stores with at least 9 employees, which translates
into a decline in real terms by 1.4% yoy. Wholesale turnover was down by 9.4%
yoy in the same period. The quantities of goods shipped declined by over 13%
yoy in the 1Q2009. Altogether the abovementioned sectors have a share of 57-
58% in the total valued added in the economy. Based on this data, we estimate
that GDP decreased by 0.5% to 2.0% yoy in the 1Q2009. Since we have been
consistently slightly overoptimistic on growth since the global downturn started,
we are tempted to suggest a point forecast at the bottom of this range, i. e. -
1.5% yoy, but since we have no probability distribution of hypothetical
performance, we stick to the rule of the arithmetic average of two extremes.
The global crisis has been transmitted mainly by two channels: foreign trade
(a collapse in foreign demand) and credit markets (frozen). We focus on the
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and PPI inflation. The factors behind this correction
include primarily much higher than expected energy
price adjustments in January and February that will
impact annual inflation until early 2010, combined
with a surprising rebound in prices of foodstuffs.
Taking into account all these factors and associated
risks we expect the CPI inflation to rise temporarily in
the second quarter to 3.8% year on year and then fall
to 3.6% in the third quarter entering the NBP target
range of 1.5%-3.5% in the summer. Inflation will
remain close to the upper bound of the range in
the 4Q2009 (3.4%) to fall sharply in early 2010 to
below 3%, reflecting the high base from early 2009,
and remain just below the mid-point of the range from
the second quarter onwards. On the annual level this
produces inflation of 3.5% and 2.3% in 2009 and 2010.
A strong rise in state expenditure and a negligible
rise in state revenue in the 1Q2009 suggest that fiscal
policy became strongly expansionary in the 1Q2009.
This is related to the work of automatic stabilizers as
well as to a deliberate action of the government that
simply moved expenditure to the first months of the
year. However, the government projection of the
deficit looks increasingly unrealistic under recession as
its forecast was based on a much better performance
of the economy. The government will have to overhaul
its budget in the middle of the year, but this fact has
already been discounted by financial markets and it
has little economic merit. We forecast the central
government cash deficit will grow to 41 bn zlotys
in 2009 or 3.1% of GDP, estimated at around 1310 bn
zlotys. The public sector deficit may exceed 5%-6% of
GDP in 2009. The original 2009 deficit plans were
consistent with the intent to adopt the euro in 2012,
but this date is beyond reach at present.
Unprecedented drops in exports and imports in
the 1Q2009 should not be matched in the coming
quarters as conditions will slowly start improving in
the external environment of Poland, and the much
depreciated zloty will allow Polish companies to
exploit their competitive edge. The latter is the main
reason why Polish exports fell less than imports
despite shallower recession in Poland than in partner
countries. The current account was near balance in
the 1Q2009 and this augurs its substantial decline in
the course of 2009 to 2-3% of GDP from 5.5% of GDP
in 2008. These developments will underpin the zloty
that is fundamentally undervalued so it will gradually
strengthen over 2009 an 2010.
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first one while the impact of the second channel is discussed in the section on
Monetary Developments. Exports of goods and services dropped 13.8% yoy in
euro terms, causing a slump in manufacturing. Since imports fell even faster
in the 1Q2009, we estimate the overall contribution to growth by the external
side of the economy was slightly positive, contrary to the 4Q2008. It is
tempting to explain this phenomenon by the significant depreciation of the
real exchange rate (see the section on Balance of Payments), as GDP in Poland
declined, markedly less than in main partner countries or regions such the
euro zone or Russia, UK and Ukraine. 
Private consumption was a driver of growth as had been expected and will
continue to do so. However, it came likely a bit lower than our previous
prediction of 2.2% yoy. This downward revision is not related to lower
disposable incomes on a year ago, which rose quite considerably since real pay
increases were still around 3% in real terms, personal income taxes were cut and
pensioners received a considerable compensation for the 2008 inflation and
wage growth though the latter occurred in the final month of the quarter.
Adjusted for the rise in unemployment whose average rate was not different in
the 1Q2009 from its rate in the 1Q2008 (see section on the Labor Market), there
was every reason to expect the private consumption to grow by around 3% yoy.
Our previous forecast took into account the adverse impact of the scare about
the crisis, but it looks now that the negative impact of the overwhelming fear
for unemployment was higher than previously „guesstimated”. We forecast,
therefore, that private consumption grew by 2.0% yoy instead of 2.2% yoy.
Surprisingly, the newly revised GDP data point to a strong pickup in public
consumption in the 4Q2008, contrary to the previous release. It actually grew
by 14.1% yoy and by 7.6% yoy, whereas it had originally been reported to
increase 3% yoy and 0.0%, respectively. This leads to significant changes in our
forecast of it. Judging by a large growth of state budget outlays year on year in
the 1Q2009, and taking into account that public sector, in particular
administration, did not shed any labor force, strong growth may have
continued in the 1Q2009. The share of public consumption in GDP in the first
quarter of the year fluctuates around 19% so its rise by 5% yoy – 10% yoy would
add almost 1% yoy -2% yoy to economic growth. Such outcome is possible.
Figure 1. GDP Growth Factors, quarterly % yoy
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Revised GDP data point as well to a small drop in inventories by PLN 0.9
bn in the 4Q2008, contrary to the previous report when a rise of PLN 8 bn
was reported. This correction sheds new light on the business cycles
developments as it means that Polish firms started reducing excessive
inventories in late 2008 so the inventory cycle should be in full swing in
the 1Q2009. Therefore we forecast that gross capital formation in
the 1Q2009 (aka gross investment in the USA) will be a strong drag on GDP
performance, and fell more than in our previous forecast. It also decreased
significantly more than the fixed business investment. In turn, private fixed
business investment was mostly driven by the inertia of the process in
the 1Q2009, i. e. continued projects and replacement investment, but new
projects were in a short supply. Public investment improved somewhat,
compared to the 1Q2008, as the data on the use of the EU funds point to,
but its size could only partially, if not only fractionally, offset the collapse in
business fixed investment.
Short-term growth prospects for the economy are bad and they have
markedly worsened since writing the previous report. The latest round of
downward revisions to global growth forecasts is probably the last one in
this slump, but it also drags down our growth forecasts for the Polish
economy. It will likely continue contracting in the 2Q2009, either year on
year or quarter on quarter, the slippage exacerbated by the prolonged deep
recession in the euro zone and in Eastern Europe. Lately, the rate of decline
in output in OECD countries have been slower than in the 4Q2008 and the
beginning of 2009, business confidence improved, but the bottom has not
been reached yet. This poses a question mark whether the Polish economy
will bottom out in the 2Q2009 as we had thought. There is such a possibility
because business sentiment and consumer confidence improved somewhat
and unemployment will be flat in the 2Q2009. However, we forecast
a decline in GDP year on year in the 2Q2009, albeit slower than in
the 1Q2009, a resumption of slow growth in the 3Q2009 and its pickup in
the 4Q2009 above 2% yoy (Table 1). Recovery should gather strength
in 2010, fuelled by the infrastructure investment and exports. Potential GDP
growth will not be restored until the late 2010, depending on the strength
of the world-wide recovery. Despite a slowdown in average real wage
growth and rising unemployment throughout the 2009, consumption
growth should remain relatively stable, supported by the decline in personal
income tax whose positive impact will be more visible with the lapse of
time. Banks are keen to extend consumer credits and if this action succeeds,
private consumption will find more support. The government will likely
arrest growth in public consumption in the 2H2009, i. e. after the
parliamentary elections, because of the precarious state of public finances,
but its strong growth in the 1H2009 should keep it at least unchanged, if
not in a positive territory, in 2009. Public investment should pick up in the
course of the year to offset the decline in the private investment to a higher
and higher degree. This will exert some positive ripple effects on business
investment, in particular in non-residential construction. Contrary to the
previous forecast, the net export contribution to GDP growth should be
positive in all quarters of 2009 as the slowly improving economic prospects
in the EU will help Polish firms exploit their competitive edge over foreign
companies due to the depreciated zloty despite that the zloty should firm in
the course of the year. 
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Inflation and Monetary Policy
Review of 1Q2009
The CPI inflation rate declined to 3.2% year on year in the first quarter of 2009
from 3.7% in the final quarter of 2008, benefiting from falling prices of fuel,
transportation, telecommunication and most market services. On the other
hand, prices of foodstuffs that were primarily responsible for the deceleration
of inflation in the second half of 2008, rebounded in January 2009 and have
been on the rise since then. Adding to inflationary pressures were prices of
energy, continuing their upward trend and peaking in the first quarter at the
highest level in more than a decade. However, on the whole the economic
gloom has been so far efficiently depressing prices of goods and services,
weakening a pass-through of the marked depreciation onto retail prices. 
The downward effect of the sharp deceleration of economic activity on prices
was clearly discernible in the initial months of 2009. Tumbling world prices of
oil to just above $40 a barrel, the lowest since late 2004, cut the Polish retail
price of gasoline by nearly 15% on average in the first quarter, triggering
significant declines in prices of all transportation services. Household budgets
are gradually beginning to feel the brunt of falling income dynamics and
worsening employment prospects. This has led producers and retailers to
abstain from raising prices in spite of the markedly increasing import costs
related to the weak zloty. The annual depreciation vis-a-vis the euro rose
from 11% in December to 17% in January and further up to roughly 30% in
February-April, putting a massive strain on the financial situation of producers
and importers alike. So far no attempts at passing these costs onto consumers
can be discerned as prices of industrial goods, typically anchored by the import
cost-competition, show no signs of acceleration with the exception of fuels.
Most consumer durables remain on the deflationary path: prices of clothing
and footwear fell by 7.5% year on year in the1Q2009 (vs. 6.9% in all 2008),
home appliances – by 2.1% (vs. 1.3% in 2008), audiovisual and photographic
equipment – by 11.4% (vs. 13.5% in 2008) and cars – by 5.3% (vs. 2.7%
in 2008). Deflation or very low inflation in most industrial goods follows, to
some extent, from recession-triggered price declines at a global level. However,
even accounting for this factor the dynamics of Polish prices of industrial
goods is much lower (-0.4%1 year on year in the 1Q2009) than in the euro zone
(+0.8%) despite a prolonged period of sizeable depreciation – indicating
harsher demand conditions in the Polish retail market. 
Likewise, a gloomy market situation has been keeping prices of most services
down. The entire service aggregate1 decelerated to 4.2% year on year in the
first quarter from 4.7% in the second half of 2008 amid shrinking demand and
falling cost of business (transportation, rents). Declines were registered in
catering, health, education and culture but also in postal and
telecommunication services as well as the formerly discussed transport services.
With demand side pressures in check it was the supply-side-triggered price
hikes that led the inflationary process in initial months of the year – although
this time they are neither high nor likely to be long-lasting. Inflation of
foodstuffs grew to 3.8% year on year in the 1Q2009 up from 3.4% in 4Q2008
on the back of a combination of local supply developments and the impact of
EU policies. Domestic production cycles and supply fluctuations led to the
significant acceleration in prices of various kinds of meat (to 7.6% in
the 1Q2009, up by 3 percentage points from the 4Q2008) and vegetables
(to 10.8%, up by 3.5 p. pts.) while the EU's Common-Agricultural-
1 Data related to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices – HICP.
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Policy-induced output control pushed up the prices of sugar (to 5%, up
by 11.2 p. pts.) and related confectionary products. On the hand, prices of
cereal and dairy products exhibit continuously slowing dynamics, benefiting
from ample domestic and global supply that has been rebounding after last
year's demand-induced price surge. 
The energy aggregate comprised of electricity, gas, and heating hit a new
high of 14.4% year on year on average in the first quarter although began to
decelerate from the peak of 14.8 in January to 13.9% in March, suggesting
a slight downward trend for future months. January saw administrative
adjustments of prices of electricity, heating fuel and hot water by 3.8%, 2.6%
and 1.6%, respectively, followed by an additional massive 7.8% hike in
electricity prices in February. The fact that these adjustments take place
some 2-3 quarters after the peak of world energy commodity prices is
a consequence of the lengthy approval process by the Energy Regulation
Agency (URE), which exercises direct controls over key energy prices. 
Figure 2. Annual Inflation in Poland, quarterly, % yoy
The administrative and supply-side origin of most price increases is best
evidenced in the development of core inflation. Core inflation without prices
of food and energy as well as core inflation excluding administrative prices
stood at 2.3% yoy and 2.2% yoy, respectively, in the first quarter, reflecting
that the core non-food and free-market component of the consumer basket
exhibits very low inflation. 
The first quarter saw a sharp rise in the producer price inflation. Compared
to the fourth quarter of 2008 the PPI inflation more than doubled
reaching 5.0% year on year on the back of robust increases in January and
February 2009 – by 2.3% and 2.6% month on month, respectively. The most
direct impulse came from the abovementioned URE-approved hikes in prices
of electricity and gas, which pushed overall inflation in the energy sector
to 21.3% on average in the first quarter 2009 from 12.4% in 4Q2009.
Inflation in this sector fell somewhat in March, i. e. to 20.9%, as a result of
changes in the law regulating the conditions of levying the excise tax, but
remains the highest in more than a decade. 
Prices in manufacturing picked up as well to 2.6% in the first quarter -they
were up from 0.8% in the 4Q2008 – owing to substantial price increases in
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the production of foodstuffs, textiles and clothing, machinery and equipment
and electrical machines, car and transportation equipment as well as
furniture. Counteracting these tendencies was the deepening deflation in the
manufacturing of coke and petroleum products (-19.1% year on year in the
first quarter vs. -4.7% in 4Q2008) and sharp disinflation in prices of some of
Polish major export commodities: metals and chemicals. 
The only sector posting declining producer price inflation was mining and
quarrying where annual price growth fell to 8.9% in the 1Q2009 from 9.7%
in the 4Q2008. This is a consequence of the continued deceleration of prices
of some of Poland's key commodities: coal and copper as well as other
materials quarried domestically such as crude petroleum and natural gas.
Forecast
Compared to the previous issue of PEO, we significantly raised forecasts of
both CPI and PPI inflation. The factors behind this correction include primarily
much higher than expected energy price adjustments in January and February
that will impact annual inflation until early 2010, combined with a surprising
rebound in prices of foodstuffs.
The supply situation in agricultural markets will depend on the length and
severity of the draught that prevailed in April and May. It is certain that some losses
will be incurred, but at the same time specialists indicate sizeable excess grain in
the market and grain reserves that continue to depress prices: March procurement
prices of wheat and rye stood at a mere 50% of last year's level. Prices of pork,
accounting for roughly 3 expenditures on meat, are likely to decelerate in view of
the swine flue and the ensuing precautionary decline in demand. Moreover there
are prospects of increased domestic supply of pork thanks to the upward rebound
in the production cycle following the markedly improved production profitability.
(konczy sie chyba takze świnski dolek, produkcja jest bardzo opłacalna w ujeciu
cena zywca/tona paszy czy coś takeigo – moze wspomnij?). Combining these
moderately favorable predictions with forecasts of stable or falling world prices of
main agricultural commodities, we expect inflation of foodstuffs to moderate in
the summer and slightly decline afterwards. 
World prices of oil and other non-food commodities are likely to stabilize or
fall slightly in the remainder of the year depending on the magnitude of
recession in major global markets. 
Exchange rate continues to be one of the major risk factors for inflation
forecast. Our exchange rate predictions imply sustained, roughly 30%
depreciation vis-a-vis the euro in the 2Q2009 and the 3Q2009 that will fall to
around 9% in the 4Q2009. As mentioned earlier recessionary prospects in the
first and second quarter, accompanied by the gradually declining disposable
income dynamics, should prevent producers and retailers from widespread
passing the depreciation-associated costs onto consumers. However, some
price increases are inevitable and likely to occur in the case of vehicle fuel (in
line with developments in the 1Q) or goods and services closely tied to foreign
prices, e.g. tourism services or imported foodstuffs with no domestic
substitutes (citrus fruits, coffee, tea). This will effectively balance price
declines in many sectors making inflation more persistent than in neighboring
countries from the euro area or with currencies tied to the euro. 
Taking into account all these factors and associated risks we expect the CPI
inflation to rise temporarily in the second quarter to 3.8% year on year and
then fall to 3.6% in the third quarter entering the NBP target range of 1.5%-
3.5% in the summer. Inflation will remain close to the upper bound of the
range in the 4Q2009 (3.4%) to fall sharply in early 2010 to below 3%,
reflecting the high base from early 2009, and remain just below the mid-point
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of the range from the second quarter onwards. On the annual level this
produces inflation of 3.5% and 2.3% in 2009 and 2010.
Predictions are burdened with much higher risks in the case of the PPI due
to the higher impact of unstable commodity prices and the exchange rate.
After the sharp increase in late 2008 and early 2009 we expect producer price
inflation to stabilize around 5.5% yoy until the end of 2009 and gradually fall
throughout 2010 to 3% yoy in the 4Q2010. On the annual basis these
developments will result in the average inflation of 5.4% and 3.3% in 2009
and 2010, respectively.
Monetary Developments and Policy
The year-on-year statistics continues pointing to a credit boom, but it is totally
misleading. Actually, credit to non-financial firms came to a standstill in
the 1Q2009 mainly because of a credit crunch, i. e. problems of credit supply,
but firms stopped asking for investment credit as well so demand for credits
also fell. Firms report severe difficulties obtaining working capital from banks.
According to the NBP April survey, more than 50% of banks tightened loan
standards and 80% raised credit margins in the 1Q2009 so the credit crunch
escalated though a quarter earlier 80% of banks reported a tightening o credit
standards. Firms limited their interest in long-term credits, which is related to
the collapse in private fixed investment. The only comforting fact is that interest
rates on loans have eventually come down, following significant reductions in
the NBP interest rates, but the access to credit is poor (see figure 5). 
Figure 3. Broad Money and Credit Expansion, % yoy
On surface credit to nonfinancial companies grew in the 1Q2009 as it
amounted to PLN 225.7 bn end of March 2009 versus PLN 216.2 bn end of
December 2008. A rise by 9.5 bn zlotys or by 4.3% in relative terms looks
solid, but, when adjusted for the appreciation of the euro by 12.6% between
these dates, it shrinks to PLN 2.9 bn or 1.5%2. This is the actual amount of
new credit for non-financial companies, granted in the 1Q2009, out of
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which 1.8 bn zlotys was loaned in foreign currency (FCY). When adjusted for
the PPI inflation, „new” credit to non-financial corporations declined by 3.5%
qoq in the 1Q2009 as the PPI rose by 5.1% qoq. The zloty depreciation also
meant that the share of FCY credits grew to 27.0% end of March 2009
from 24.3% end of December 2008. 
Figure 4. Housing Credit Credit Growth, % yoy
Similar trends are visible with regard to credit to households though this
credit holds better as banks make attempts to replace mortgages with
consumer credit that pays higher interest rates and matures at shorter periods
so, in theory, it carries less risk. Credit to households increased by 25.8 bn zlotys
or 6.6% from end-December 2008 to end-March 2009, again at a respectable
rate. However, the zloty value of the December volume in FCY grew by PLN 18.7
bn, which implies that new credits rose by 7.1 bn zlotys. This looks somewhat
better than in the case of non-financial firms as „new credit” increased by 7.2
bn zlotys or almost 2% from end December 2008 to end March 2009. Yet, it
also declined in real terms, albeit slightly, as the CPI inflation reached 2.2%. The
share of FCY loans in total credit to households rose to 42.5% end of
March 2009 from 40.5% end of December 2008 due to the zloty depreciation.
Figure 5. Household Credit Interest Rates 
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This short analysis points to the lack of credit in the economy that could
support its growth. Trends that were shaped in the 4Q2008, continued to hit
the economy. In the 4Q2008 Polish commercial banks, mostly owned by
foreign capital, transmitted the credit crunch to Poland as their parent
companies cut them credit (swap) lines in foreign currencies, e. g. in the euro
and the Swiss franc, which served as a basis of credit expansion.
Figure 6. Household Deposit Interest Rates
Nominal broad money (M3) rose by 17.5% yoy in the 1Q2009 compared
with 18.6% yoy in December 2008 so no tendency to decline can be identified.
Total deposits grew by 19.4% yoy versus 20.6% yoy in December 2008. The
rates of growth in household and company deposits continued to be
differential 25.3% yoy and 6.9% yoy in March 2009, respectively, compared
with 26.5% and 4.0% yoy in December 2008, respectively, but on a quarterly
basis the rates of growth are small. The depreciation of the zloty in
January-February 2009 kept on increasing the value of deposits, but high
deposit interest rates continued to exert the same impact. The rate of
expansion of time deposits of households was 45.8% yoy while the rate of
growth of demand deposits was only 6.1% in March 2009. The latter has
considerably fallen since September 2008, the first month when commercial
banks started aggressively competing for deposits due to liquidity problems,
caused by the global crisis in the aftermath of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers collapse. The average interest rate on time deposits up to 2 years
was 6.3% p. a. and demand deposits was 1.6% p. a. in the 1Q2009,
respectively. This discrepancy continued to increase. It is evident that the public
switches its demand deposits to time deposits in the environment where
alternative investments are treated with suspicion due to the elevated risk
aversion despite a recent surge of optimism on the stock market. The rise in
state guarantees on household deposits to the equivalent of 50 thousand euro
was also instrumental in this respect. The pickup in stock exchanges since
March 10 has been too short to change portfolio decisions of households in
such a way that it would impact monetary statistics. This coincided with the
further central bank interest rate cuts: the NBP key open market operations
rate was reduced to 3.75% in March 2009 from 5.00% in December 2008.
The banking sector reported distinctively lower net income in the 1Q2009
than in the 4Q2008, when its profits declined for the first time in 2008, when
the sector became the second important channel of the global crunch
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transmission to the Polish economy. No official data on the first quarter were
available as of writing, but only fragmented releases by incorporated
institutions, yet the picture is bleak. Net income was only a fraction of
the 1Q2008 magnitude. However it is not related to a rise in non-performing
assets, the case of parent institutions of Polish banks from the „old” EU
countries, but to the drastic cut in access to credit by the non-financial sector
and the narrowing of spreads between credit and deposit rates. The sector
also raised provisions, forced by the significant depreciation of the zloty, as
over 150 bn are denominated in the Swiss franc, and to cushion potential
problems settling option contracts concluded with Polish firms (provisions of
PLN 1.5 bn) as well as to build a buffer for future non-performing assets,
whose upcoming rise is inevitable. For instance, BRE raised its provisions
tenfold, compared with the 1Q2008; BHP that reported a loss in the 1Q2009
doubled them on a year ago. Thus the banking sector has become a culprit of
its own behavior. Sadly, the economy has suffered badly as well. 
The worst for the banking sector is yet to come since irregular credits have
only started growing. In December 2008, the latest data available, the share
of irregular assets was 3.7%, down from 4% on a year ago while irregular
credits consisted 3.5% of the total credit, down from 4.1% on year ago. These
indicators should have deteriorated in the 1Q2009, but casual reports did not
point to a sudden rise in these credits. Despite a rising unemployment,
employment was still slightly up on the 1Q2008 and firms were quite liquid
as they have accumulated large deposits relative to GDP.
The banking sector is over-liquid in aggregate so the shortage of liquidity
does not seem to be the main problem any longer, as it was in the 4Q2008.
However, liquidity is unevenly distributed so a few banks still suffer from the
stress despite that new NBP credit facilities and the overall thaw on the global
financial markets have managed to ease it somewhat. It seems that the next
problem to be solved is the recapitalization of a number of banks. The capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) stood at 10.8% at the 2008 yearend, down from 11.8%
in the 3Q2008 and 12.8% in December 2007. It likely kept on downtrending
in the 1Q2009. Even if it were unchanged, the 10%, recommended by the
Polish FSA as a minimum, looks low by the current financial crisis standards,
when depositors/customers seem to demand ratios in the range of 13% -15%
because of the tarnished bank reputation. To reach this level banks would
probably have to raise about 20 bn zlotys of new capital, i. e. increase it by
about 20-25%. This seems a substantial amount. Two Polish banks due to
reputation problems of their parent companies have already been
recapitalized, but these amounts may prove insufficient. We forecast that
the 2009 net income of the banking sector will downsize to a third of more
than 14 bn zlotys in 2008. Despite likely losses at a number of banks and even
in the sector as whole in the coming quarters, it is unlikely that a major
institution were threatened by a bankruptcy. Anyhow, the government and
the NBP will have ready a law by this time that would allow the state to take
over such an institution should its foreign owners not deliver a rescue.
Therefore such an occurrence should lead to only temporary disruptions in the
functioning of the financial system at worst. Instead, mergers and takeover
are possible, but they will be driven by the shakeup of the financial sector in
the countries of foreign owners. Polish Financial Supervisory Commission
recommends banks not to distribute 2009 profits to shareholders or owners
so that they raise the capital base, but whether this „moral suasion' will work
remains unclear. Polish banks are rather good assets due to the potential
growth prospects so their mother institutions, in need of capital, may spin
2 The actual performance in 2008 is compared to the results of 2007.
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them off to replenish their capital base. One should not forget that the stock
capitalization of Citibank Handlowy was on one day in February 2009 larger
than its mother company's Citigroup and so is WBK's capitalization relative to
its parent Allied Irish Bank.
Fiscal Developments and Policy
According to the preliminary data, the central government cash budget
registered a deficit of 10.6 bn zlotys in the 1Q2009, lower than projected by
the MoF. This is equivalent to 58.3% of the 18.2 bn zlotys, targeted by the
state budget in 2009. The state revenue came at 66.3 bn zlotys, just a dash
lower than the MoF projections of 65.9 bn, while the state expenditure
at 76.9 bn zlotys was short of the planned 78.2 bn by a bit larger amount.
The rise in the central government revenue and expenditure was about 2.5%
yoy and 22.3% yoy in the 1Q2009, respectively, implying that the increase in
expenditure was substantial in absolute as well as in relative terms to the
growth in the revenue. These tendencies suggest that fiscal policy became
strongly expansionary in the 1Q2009. The fact that the state budget recorded
a small surplus in the 1Q2008 whereas it fell into a quite substantial deficit in
the 1Q2009 also seems to confirm this. However, the conclusion should be
qualified for the fact that expenditure may have risen due to the work of
automatic stabilizers, when GDP probably declined in the y-o-y terms so fiscal
expansion may not have been so strong as the raw figures suggest. Instead,
a structural budget should be considered, but have only partial information,
which des not allow us to estimate it in quarters. 
Figure 7. Central Government Budget Deficit, % annual projection
The forecast about declining GDP finds support in figures on tax collection
in the 1Q2009. The revenue from personal and corporate income taxes was
up by 3.5% yoy and down by 2.0% yoy, respectively. The former reflects the
fact that despite a rising trend in unemployment, employment in the
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economy was still higher than in the 1Q2008 and average wage increased by
some 6%-7% yoy in this period while the cuts in PIT rates did not produce
a strong offsetting effects (see Labor Market section)3. The latter reflects
decrease in profits of enterprises due to the decline in economic activity. The
indirect tax collection came lower by 1.7% yoy, reflecting a decline in the
amount of transactions. Since exports are exempt from the VAT, this implies
that a decline in domestic sales was responsible for this drop. The VAT
collection fell by some 10%-11% yoy. On the other hand the excise-tax
revenue rose by 14.0% yoy despite a fall in prices of fuels, but this was due to
a booking-keeping trick, i. e. a one-time shift of the revenue from 2008 to
January 2009, and a rise in tax rates on tobacco, to much lesser extent. The
rise in one kind of revenue should be comforting: these are unrequited EU
structural funds that amounted to 2.0 bn zlotys in the 1Q2009 versus 0.3 bn
zlotys in the 1Q2008. Their six-fold rise implies that the public investment,
fuelled by the EU money, is picking up though this rise is still too modest to
offset the collapse of private fixed business investment. 
Figure 8. General Government Budget Deficit, % annual projection
Source: Convergence Program Update January 2009.
As concerns the state expenditure in the 1Q2009, a rise in subsidies to the
Social Insurance Fund and the Social Fund of Farmers by 80.8% and 23%,
respectively, is striking. This is supposedly connected to a prepayment of the
subsidy for the remaining part of the year, which may, in turn, be linked to
the annual compensation of pensioners for inflation and real wage growth
in 2008. This hypothesis is supported by the doubling of the subsidy in March,
when it grew by over 3 bn zlotys. The largest monthly increase in the subsidy
to Farmers' Social Fund also occurred in March. On the other hand, a rise in
the subsidy could signal that the social insurance funds suffer from a shortage
of premiums in the recession period. Well, this is was not the case in
the 1Q2009 since employment did not fall and wage aggregates rose in real
terms. However, such developments cannot be excluded in the upcoming
quarters should economy slip further. A rise in public debt service in
the 1Q2009 versus the 1Q2008 as a percentage of the annual schedule should
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3 The actual performance in 2008 is compared to the results of 2007.
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not be interpreted as a signal that the government has started incurring
unexpectedly higher costs due to a rise in the risk premium. The government
has assumed that the average NBP key interest rate will be 6.2% in 2009 while
it is 3.75% as of writing. It is unlikely, therefore, that when the applicable risk
premium is added, the cost of debt service exceeds the plan. Actually, a 10
year government benchmark bond yields around 6.00%. By the way, it is
just 0.5 percentage point more than the worst performer's, Greece's, in the
euro zone. The bottom line is that the relative rise in the cost service is linked
to the timetable. The mirror image of a better absorption of EU funds is
a considerable increase in public fixed investment. The central government
spent 2.8 bn zlotys or 15% of the yearly plan on it in January-February 2009
versus 0.7 bn or 4% of the annual plan in the 1Q2008.
The 2009 budget assumes that the central government revenue and
expenditure will rise by 19.3% and 15.3% relative to the actual performance
in 2008, respectively. Such a substantial rise in cash revenue looks highly
unrealistic when these figures are compared to the corresponding figures on
the 1Q2009, as the economy has come to a halt. Even assuming a pickup in
growth in the 2H2009, as we do, will not change the situation that revenue
growth will strongly underperform the 2009 budget draft while expenditure will
come on target, at best, but it is likely to overrun it despite the efforts of the
government to avoid it. The government will have to overhaul its budget in the
middle of the year, but this fact has already been discounted by financial markets
and it has little economic merit, but is a legal act that will certainly excite press
and opposition politicians for a while without any economic consequences.
We pointed in the previous issue of the PEO to major risks of overruns
should economic growth fall to the lower end of the present government
range forecast, which is still 1.7% to 3.7% with unofficial statements of 0.5%
to 1.0%, i.e. still a positive territory. We estimated that, assuming
a hypothetical scenario of zero economic growth and the same tax elasticities
as in the budget bill, but a lower GDP deflator of 2% in 2009, we forecast that
the tax revenue would be some 32 billion zlotys short of 251.4 bn zlotys,
projected in the state budget. This would cause the cash budget deficit to
reach about PLN 50 billion or 3.8% of GDP, provided that all other revenue
and expenditure remain unchanged as in the state budget bill, i. e. ceteris
paribus. When the total amount of announced expenditure savings of 10 bn
zlotys is accounted for, the central government cash deficit would grow to 41
bn zlotys or 3.1% of GDP, estimated at around 1310 bn zlotys. 
The general government deficit in ESA-95 terms surprisingly rose to 3.9% of
GDP in 2008, i. e. it breached the 3% threshold as it occurred in April, but no
details are available why it happened in times when the cash central
government deficit was low 1.8% of GDP. Apparently, social security funds an
local government added much to the shortfall. If their deficit were the same
in 2009, then the public sector deficit may exceed 5%-6% of GDP in 2009. The
European Commission is likely to restart the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)
not for the reason of bad prospects, since many countries will have nothing
to brag about in 2009, but because the deficit breached the threshold when
growth was 4.9%, i. e. close to potential. 
The 2009 deficit plans were consistent with the intent to adopt the euro
in 2012, but this date is beyond reach right now. Poland meets only one
convergence criterion of the public debt below 60% of GDP and 6% deficits will
cause a rapid rise in the public debt though we do not forecast a breach of the
criterion any time soon. The entry to the ERM-2 is not contingent on meeting
Maastricht criteria and, for instance, Slovakia has been under the EDP along with
Poland since 2004 until it was removed in 2008. However, the high volatility of
the zloty jeopardizes the entry to the ERM-2 since the zloty can depreciate more
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than 15% from the parity. On the other hand, the currency is depreciated so its
downside potential is small, but, to be on a safe side, the government would
have to fix a parity rate that is way from fundamentals and then systematically
revalue the zloty. This is unappealing and can lead to speculative runs.
Labor Market
Employment
As we expected in the previous PEO issue the labor market situation in
the 1Q2009 seriously deteriorated following the fall in economic growth and
widely expected recession. Employment in the so-called enterprise sector (the
companies employing more than 9 workers) decreased by 0.2% yoy in
the 1Q2009, reaching 5,350,000. It was the first employment reduction in
y-o-y terms since the 4Q2004. On the quarterly basis, the number of
employed fell by 0.5% in 1Q2009, by 0.3 percentage point more than in
the 4Q2008. For comparison, employment increased on the quarterly basis
by 2.5% in the 1Q2008. 
The analysis of employment dynamics in specific industries is complicated.
Since the beginning of 2009, the CSO changed the classification of economic
activities, used in monthly reports from the enterprise sector. The same
applies to wage data. Although the data has been recalculated back to
November 2007 one cannot monitor the industry specific developments
backwards more than one year.
The picture is mixed, with some sectors recording employment reductions
and others still expanding. The situation seems to deteriorate most
dynamically in the manufacturing. In the 1Q2009 the number of employees in
this industry fell by 5.2% yoy and 3.3% qoq. It is equivalent to the y-o-y
reduction of 113,000 jobs, whereas the total employment fell by 9,000
persons. It means that in other sectors altogether the number of employees
actually grew in yoy terms by 104,000. 
Employment growth was the most dynamic in hotels and restaurants
where the number of employees increased by 7.9% yoy. Employment grew
also relatively strong in construction (by 4.6% yoy) and in retail trade
sections (by 4.1%) In other industries, the y-o-y growth rate was 2% – 3%.
The only sections, not accounting for manufacturing, where employment
actually contracted in y-o-y terms in the1Q2009 was property management
(by 2.2%) and other administrations and support services, (by 0.4% yoy). By
the way, it had been treated as one section till 2008 that has been divided
since the beginning of 2009. 
Unfortunately, due to changes in the classification, one is not able to
directly compare sector specific employment dynamics in the 1Q2009 with
earlier periods. It seems, however, that in most of the sections, with the
exception of hotels and restaurants, the employment dynamics is weaker than
in previous quarters. 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) figures for the 4Q2008 were presented in the
previous PEO issue. They were still positive, but the first signs of deterioration
were visible as employment grew by 3% yoy i. e. by 0.6 percentage points less
than in the 3Q2008. Unfortunately, the LFS employment data for the 1Q2009
are still not available. One may, however, assess it, taking into account the
employment dynamics induced by the current registered number of
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unemployed and the registered unemployment rate4. The LFS y-o-y
employment dynamics in the 1Q2009 should not exceed 0.5%-1%. 
Following the reduction of expected GDP growth, our forecast concerning
the employment growth is also more pessimistic than in the previous PEO
issue. In the 2Q2009, the enterprise sector employment growth should fall in
y-o-y terms by 3% and by 2.5% qoq. We also expect that the LFS figures will
start to deteriorate in 2009 more quickly that we forecasted in the previous
PEO issue. The LFS employment in the 2Q2009 will fall by 0.8%, an equivalent
to the q-o-q decrease of 2.3%. We expect that in 2009, on average,
employment in the enterprise sector will actually fall by 3.6% yoy and the LFS
employment will fall by 1.3% yoy. 
Wages
Wage dynamics are still weakening. In the 1Q2009, the average nominal
wage in the enterprise sector was up by 6.3% yoy, while in the 4Q2008, the
y-o-y increase was 7.7%. Real wage dynamics in the 1Q2009 also decreased
to the 3.0% yoy from 3.8% in the 4Q2008. 
Similarly, as in case of employment figures for the enterprise sector we are
not able to compare current wage dynamics in specific industries with those
from earlier periods. It seems, however, that wage growth slowed down in all
important sections. The lowest wage growth in the 1Q2009 was recorded in
hotels and restaurants (4.3% yoy) and the highest in administrative and
support service activities (the new section – earlier part of real estate and
business services), where it reached 8.5% yoy. A relatively high wage growth
rate was still seen in construction with the y-o-y change of 7.2%. 
The wage data confirm also the severity of situation in manufacturing.
Employers in this section do not only reduce employment, but they also
reduce wage increases, which in the 1Q2009 fell to 5% yoy from about 7%
yoy in the 4Q2008. By the way, the wage data from this section seem to be
comparable between 2008 and 2009, also some differences in overlapping
figures can also be observed. 
We expect the downward trend to last, following the continuing
economic downturn. Average nominal wage growth in the 2Q2009 should
fall to around 5.2%-5.3% yoy. It will result in real wages growing at
about 2% yoy. On average, nominal wages will grow in 2009 by 4% – 5%
and real wages by about 2%. During 2010 real wage growth on a y-o-y basis
can even fall to 1.4%-1.5% you, but then it will start to accelerate reaching
the average of about 2% yoy. 
Unemployment
Unemployment is increasing, following the general negative trends in the
economy. In the 1Q2009, number of registered unemployed persons
reached 1,730,000 and the unemployment rate 11.2%, which was exactly the
number we forecasted in the previous PEO issue. It means that the number of
unemployed increased by 3.3% yoy, and it was the first increase of the
registered unemployment since the 2Q2003. The growth of unemployment in
the q-o-q terms reached 19.3%. To compare, in the1Q2008 the number of
unemployed actually decreased by 2.5% yoy. 
4 It is the employment figure used by CSO to calculate the registered unemployment rate, where the
unemployment rate equals to the number of unemployed, divided by the sum of number of unemployed and
the number of employed. This employment figure is quite well correlated with the LFS employment. 
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Similarly, as in the previous PEO issue, we have cleaned the unemployment
figures for the 1Q2009 from a seasonal component5. In the 1Q2009, the
seasonally adjusted number of unemployed increased by 9.8% as compared
to the 4Q2008. The estimated seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in the
end of the 1Q2009 reached 10.5%, i. e. an equivalent of the seasonally
adjusted increase of 0.8 percentage points. It means that about half of the
unemployment increase in q-o-q terms in the 1Q2009 was due to seasonal
factors and half resulted from the actual worsening of labor market situation. 
The other information coming from PES is not reassuring, either. The
number of unemployed finding new jobs fell rapidly by 26.8% yoy in
the 1Q2009 as compared to 17.9% in 4Q2008. The number of those finding
unsubsidized jobs dropped even more quickly by 27.7% yoy in the 4Q2008 as
compared to 20.6% in 4Q2008. The employment offices are not able to find
subsidized jobs for the unemployed, either. In the 1Q2009, the number of
persons, placed to subsidized workplaces, also decreased substantially, i.e.
by 19.5% yoy) whereas in the 4Q2008, it was only 5.2% lower than a year
earlier, and in the 3Q2008, it actually increased by 5.6% yoy. 
In addition, one records extremely high increases of newly unemployed
persons in registers. In the 1Q2009 the number of the new unemployed
increased by 35.9% yoy. Such extremely rapid increases of inflow of new
unemployed into the registers has not been recorded since the 1Q1999 when
it peaked to almost 50%. 
Figure 9. Employment and real wage dynamics in enterprise sector;
and registered unemployment dynamics in Poland 2003-2008.
Source: Own calculations based on Statistical Bulletins of Polish CSO (GUS)
The only LFS-based data for the 1Q2009 can be found in EUROSTAT,
publishing monthly a so-called harmonized unemployment rate for all EU
members. According to these seasonally- adjusted data, the unemployment
rate in Poland in March 2009 was 7.7%, i. e. by 0.7 percentage point more
than in December 2008. It is still below the EU27 average (8.3%) which
increased since December 2008 also by 0.7 percentage points. The highest
unemployment rate in Europe was in Spain (17.4% in March 2009, where it
rose by 3 percentage points since December 2009) and the lowest in
4 De-seasoning performed using the DEMETRA 2.1 software and Tramo/Seats methodology. 
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Netherlands (2.8%, an increase 2008 by 0., 1 percentage point since
December). One can conclude that the magnitude of the observed increase in
the unemployment rate in Poland is similar to the „European average rate”.
We expect the registered unemployment rate to actually fall in the 2Q2009
to 10.9% but this fall will result only from seasonal phenomena – actually, it will
be by 1.5 percentage points higher than in the 2Q2008. The LFS unemployment
should continue to increase and in the 1Q2009 it will reach 7.8%. Both,
registered and LFS unemployment will further grow in 2009. We expect the
registered unemployment rate to reach 12.8% at the end of 2009, while the LFS
unemployment rate will probably grow to 9%. Thus we have slightly corrected
our last forecasts upwards. This correction results from our generally more
pessimistic expectations concerning the economic growth in 2009. 
External Trade and Balance of Payments
Declines in exports and imports growth steepened in the 1Q2009. According
to the NBP monthly data, exports and imports of goods in the euro terms
decreased by 22.9% and 28.9% on a year ago in the 1Q2009, respectively
(Figure 11). The trough in decline rates was in February. In the same period,
the zloty exports and imports of goods decreased by 2.1% yoy and 9.0% yoy,
respectively. We continue to report export and import changes in the zloty,
because they seem to better approximate changes in trade volumes due to
wide fluctuations in the exchange rates in 2008 and the 1Q2009; volume data
on the 1Q2009 are not available from the CSO as of writing. 
Figure 10. Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, quarterly, EUR million
Source: NBP
Exports and imports of services, expressed in euro terms, held better than
exports of goods as they fell by 13.8% yoy in the 1Q2009 while imports of
services decreased by 16.4% yoy. The collapse of the upward trends that were
arrested in the 4Q2008 shows the impact of the deep of the economic slump
in the EU and Eastern Europe on Polish foreign trade; demand is simply not
there. Based on seasonally adjusted data, GDP in the eurozone fell by 4.6%
yoy in the 1Q2009, and in the main countries of Central Europe: the Czech
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Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – by 3.4% yoy, 5.4% yoy and 4.7% yoy,
respectively, according to the preliminary data by the Eurostat. Even if GDP in
Poland dropped 1.5% yoy, the low of our range estimate, the decline would
be distinctively less in Poland. This would suggest that Polish exports should
decrease faster than imports whereas the opposite trends are developing. In
our view, the significant depreciation of the zloty that occurred in the 4Q2008
and deepened in the 1Q2009, caused a dampening of imports and restored
a strong competitive edge to Polish companies so exports suffered from the
lack of foreign demand less than imports did from the lack of Polish demand.
Other factors on the import side are much cheaper commodities than a year
ago and the collapse of business fixed investment in Poland that also
influenced imports adversely. It worth-while to underscore that combined
exports of goods and services were slightly higher than imports of goods and
services in the 1Q2009, the first such occurrence since the 1Q2005.
Figure 11. Real Effective Exchange rate of Poland, CPI deflated
The geographical breakdown of CSO preliminary foreign trade data, points
to a collapse in foreign trade volumes across the board in the 1Q2009, be it
developing countries, Eastern Europe or the euro zone. However, exports to
the Eurozone dropped distinctively less than exports to Eastern Europe, which
includes Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, i. e. the countries that experience a very
severe downturn with the expected GDP declines in the order of 6 to 10%
in 2009. Exports to the euro area, expressed in the euro, were down by 16.9%
yoy while exports to Eastern Europe fell by 38.7% yoy in this period. On the
other hand, such a differential performance cannot be noted in the case of
imports. Imports from the euro zone and Eastern Europe decreased by 31.2%
yoy and 31.0 % yoy. In our view, Polish companies that faced the shock of
a sudden depreciation of the zloty of considerable proportions, but were used
to the strongly appreciating zloty in 2008 reacted aggressively and clamped
down on imports when its costs became excessively high. We have no data on
the real depreciation of zloty in the 1Q2009, but the zloty must have become
much softer year on year due to the significant nominal depreciation in
January-February that was only fractionally reversed in March. Recall that in
the 4Q2008, the zloty weakened by 5.3% yoy and 12.2% qoq in real effective
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terms vis-a-vis 42 currencies and deflated by the CPI. The nominal
depreciation in the 1Q2009 was at least of the same proportions so it likely
exceeded 10% yoy in the 1Q2009.
Exports to Germany dropped less than overall exports so Germany, the
number one partner of Poland, gained the share in total exports for the first
time in many years. France, Italy and UK also increased their shares at the
expense of Eastern European countries. On the import side, China continued
to gain in share as it rose to 10.2% from 7.5% in the 1Q2008. Imports from
China fell only 1.9% yoy in euro terms, compared with a 27% drop of the total
imports as reported by the CSO. This shows how competitive Chinese goods
are. Another country among the first ten partner-countries, whose share in
total imports was elevated in the crisis times, is South Korea. 
According to our forecast the rolling four-quarter current account deficit
decreased to 4.1% of GDP in the 1Q2009 from the revised 5.5% of GDP in
the 4Q2008. We forecasted in the previous issue that the upward trend in the
current account would be reversed in 2009, but we did not expect that it would
happen so fast and on a such scale as we saw the ratio at 4.3% of GDP by
the 2009 yearend. We were too timid, perhaps, but time will tell. This rapid
change stems from the near-balance on the current account in the 1Q2009 that,
in turn, resulted from a sharp drop in the trade deficit and net income deficit while
net transfers increased. We pointed in PEO 1/2009 that „a further deterioration in
the trade deficit should stop at latest in the 2Q2009 because the rapid real
depreciation of zloty by over 20% on the back of the financial crisis has given
Polish companies a strong competitive edge”. We also said that „the deficit on the
income account should be reduced as the corporate sector will post significantly
lower profits in 2009 than in 2008” and transfers from EU should pick up and
offset the impact of lower private transfers from abroad due to harsh labor
market conditions there. Actually, all the factors played a role in the improvement
of the balance of payments in the 1Q2009. According to our estimates, the rolling
four quarter trade deficit dropped to 3.8% of GDP from 4.6% of GDP in
the 4Q2008, net income deficit declined to 3.0% of GDP from 3.3% of GDP and
net transfers increased to 1.7% of GDP from 1.4% of GDP in the final quarter
of 2008. Net services contribute the same 1% of GDP (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Current Account Breakdown, as % of GDP
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We do not change our qualitative forecast so the tendencies, outlined
above, will likely continue to prevail throughout the year. The slowly
improving fortunes of the European economy in late 2008 should be
instrumental in allowing for the exploitation of the restored powerful
competitive edge by Polish companies so the y-o-y exports should start
declining less and less over the year with a possible increase in the 4Q2009.
Imports will remain depressed and its dynamics will continue to trail the
dynamics of exports. The trade deficit should shrink to 3% of GDP. Net income
deficit will continue to decline to about 2.5% of GDP while net transfers
should reach 2% of GDP. Thus, the current account deficit will likely decline
to 2.5%-3% of GDP in the 4Q2009. 
Were it to happen the question how the deficit could be financed under the
present unfriendly conditions to borrowers becomes a non-issue. We forecast
such a course of events so the zloty is fundamentally undervalued right now
and will gradually strengthen over 2009 an 2010. The EU funds that come
through the capital account show the signs of growing and will most likely
cover at least 1%-1.5% of GDP. Net FDI inflows stood at 2.0%% of GDP in
the 1Q2009, and it is unlikely that they will drop to less than 1% of GDP
in 2009 despite that global prospects for FDI still look bad. However, it seems
that we have just witnessed the final round of downward revisions of global
growth forecasts by the international institutions so this outlook will probably
start improving in the 2H2009. If Poland's growth prospects do not
deteriorate further, we should see a turnaround in FDI inflows by the end of
the 3Q2009. This leaves a portion of the current account deficit that should
be financed by net portfolio and credit inflows of the magnitude of 0.5%-
1.0% of GDP. This is less than in our previous forecast of 1% to 1.5% of GDP
and it should not pose problems on the international financial markets that
seem to be gradually coming back to their senses, i. e. in the environment of
narrowing credit spreads and trickling loans, after a period of the
risk-aversion going through the roof.
Deflation Scare – Not in Poland
The plunge in consumer price inflation below zero raised the specter of
deflation and revived memories of the Japanese experience in the 1990s. US
and Japanese CPI declined by 0.4% yoy and 0.3% yoy, respectively in
March 2009. A year ago the CPI index rose by 4.0% yoy and 1.2% yoy in these
countries, respectively. The USA has not experienced a y-o-y drop in the CPI
since 1955. In the Euro area, CPI increased only 0.6% yoy in March 2009 while
it stood at 3.3% yoy a year ago. A few countries such as Ireland, Portugal and
Spain registered drops in the index. Outside the Eurozone, Switzerland flirts
with deflation as well. 
These developments cause that deflation is being hotly debated among
economists now. They are divided between those who expound the danger of
deflation and those who warn against the future inflation, caused by a huge
increase in monetary bases by central banks during the ongoing global
financial and economic crisis.
A bit of theory and history
There are two basic cases of deflation, distinguished by the economic
theory. The first one is benign as caused by the changes in relative prices due
to advances in labor productivity. The overall price level drops because it is
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pulled down by lower prices of these goods that become cheaper thanks to
progress and is not related to economic weakness. This kind of deflation was
experienced by the world economy in the late 19th century. Michael Bordo [1]
points to the episode of 1873 -1896 in the USA, when prices fell by 2% per
year under the environment of solid economic growth.
However, there is another case of deflation that finds its roots in an
economic collapse when demand is weak and households and firms are highly
indebted. A continual fall in the price level leads to expectations that prices
will keep on dropping so economic agents delay their purchases for the
future, consumers do not buy durables while firms postpone investment
decisions, which in turn exacerbates the aggregate demand weakness.
Further, debts are fixed in money, i. e. their nominal values remains the same
while prices, profits and wages fall. Therefore the real burden of debts
increases, depressing spending of borrowers as they have to service their
debts. Those who find the debt service excessive, default, causing more
problems for banks that have to write off loaned assets. Collaterals suddenly
lose value so banks are forced to adjust their portfolios downward so they
start tightening credit standards. The financial system is under stress and the
recession deepens. A deflationary spiral may start.
Figure 13. Inflationary Expectations of the Public
The scale of the current crisis evokes the memory of the Great Depression
during which, i. e. in 1929-1993, the world price level declined by 27%. Bordo
and Filardo5 calculate that, over this period in the United States, annual output
declined by 7.6 percent and prices at a rate of 6.8 percent per year. After the
asset price bubble burst in early 1990, when the central bank raised its interest
rates to cool the economy, Japanese growth gradually deteriorated through
the first half of the 1990s, rebounded briefly at mid-decade, but was generally
weak until 2003, when it rebounded again on the back of rising exports. This
long spell of sub-par growth gave a rise to the term of lost decade. Consumer
5 Michael Bordo and Andrew Filardo, „Deflation and Monetary Policy in a Historical Perspective:
Remembering the Past or Being Condemned to Repeat It?” NBER Working Paper No. 10833 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
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price inflation followed the economy downward, falling below zero in 1995,
but its rate was around 1% already at the end of 1993. In response, Japanese
short-term interest rates were lowered nearly to zero by late 1995, i. e. from
their peak of 8.2% in March 1991 to 2% in March 1995 and 0.5% in
October 1995. They have stayed close to zero ever since. However, with prices
declining, real interest rates have remained positive, restraining growth.
During the current economic slump the threat of deflation may be still
overblown as indices of core inflation excluding food and energy hover much
above the zero line. The rapid drops in indices were due to the bursting of
commodity price bubbles and these plunges in energy prices are rather
temporary. The US core inflation was 1.8% yoy in March 2009 while the Euro
area core inflation was 1.5% yoy. More annoying was the pace of the decline.
In March 2008, these indices rose?? and by 2.7% yoy, respectively. 
Another argument counter the threat is the well entrenched inflationary
expectations of the broad public. ECB publishes results of a survey of
professional forecasters four times a year in its monthly bulletin. The February
release showed that expectations were substantially revised downward to
average inflation of 0.9% in 2009 and 1.4% yoy in December 2009. The
previous SPF forecasted 2009 CPI inflation at 2.2%. Should these forecasts
depend much on current inflation readings then the drop in. The US
Despite of the evidence that deflation is not imminent risk, the downward
evolution of indices sends a warning since complacency may result in
enormous growth and employment costs as the historical examples illustrate.
Deflation in Japan was widely unexpected so the proper policy responses
came with a considerable delay when it was well entrenched in the economy,
therefore harder to break.
Non-issue in Poland
Whether deflation fears in the advanced world are justified, they are
a non-issue in Poland at present. The CPI inflation rate at 4.0% yoy in April was
well above zero while the core inflation rate, excluding energy and foodstuffs,
was 2.5% yoy in March this year. The section on inflationary developments in
this report, however, points to a rapid decline in prices of market driven prices
of goods and services amid economic slowdown. One such piece of evidence
is that, except for fuels, the pass-thru of the zloty depreciation on import prices
is negligible. Most durables prices are on the deflationary path, year on year.
If households, which started to feel the pinch of the global crisis in
the 1Q2009, see it, they may further delay their previously planned purchases,
expecting further drops. In fact, inflation of industrial goods switched to
deflation as the index stood at -0.4% yoy in the 1Q2009, and its further decline
is likely. By the way, this was less than in the euro area. Inflation of prices of
market services also displays a strong downward tendency. The conclusion is
that deflationary tendencies may be delayed in comparison to the euro zone
or the United States since the crisis hit Poland also with a delay of at least two
quarters, but they are an undercurrent.
The fact that inflationary expectations are „well anchored” above zero
should not be taken as too much comfort, either (see graph 13). The
population expectations have been displaying a steep downward trend since
October 2008 despite a gradual and erratic downward trend in inflation.
These expectations are almost perfectly correlated with the most recent
inflation rate that was known to respondents at the time of the survey so the
hypothetical fall in the CPI inflation rate toward zero will likely induce the
same drop in expectations. Therefore, the conclusions about the absence of
deflationary pressures, based on them, should be treated with caution. The
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yields on long-term government bonds do not exhibit any deflationary
expectations, either. These yields have gone up due to the increase in risk
premium, caused by the global financial crisis, but even adjusted for this
surge by approximate 150 basis points, the 10-year government bond would
still yield about 4.5%. This provides more comfort.
The bottom line is that deflationary tendencies may yet to show in the
economy once the combined effects of the rise in regulated prices and the
considerable exchange rate depreciation wane. The critical time will come in
the 4Q2008 and in particular in the 1Q2009. The central bank should stay
alert should the economic slump continue because a rapid fall in inflation,
when the key interest rate will be around 3.25%, according to our prediction,
may lead to high real interest rates in the economy that would exacerbate the
recession or economic growth in its infancy, if to take our predicted GDP
expansion rate into account. To put it bluntly, a lagged response by the
central bank to deflationary pressures could kill the recovery in its infancy.
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